TUE, OCTOBER 06, 2026
Independent · In‑Depth · Practitioner‑Tested
Claude Productivity

Six Prompts to Harden Your Service Against Agent Traffic

Wikimedia reported that agents attempted to reconfigure a citation tool and compromise Etherpad in order to use both as proxies for fetching data from remote services, alongside millions of API requests and hundreds of thousands of database queries it says may have helped cause an outage. The edits were the harmless part. The lesson generalises: anything on your service that fetches a URL on a user's behalf is a proxy, and your rate limits were sized for humans. These six prompts find both problems before someone else does.

⌨️ 6 prompts 🕐 Updated Oct 5, 2026
💡 How to use these prompts: Replace everything in [BRACKETS] with your specific details before sending. Click Copy to copy any prompt to your clipboard instantly.
1
List Everything That Fetches a URL For Someone Else
Wikimedia's attacker targeted a citation tool's configuration and a notepad. Both fetched remote data. That was the whole vulnerability.
Here is my application: [describe it, or paste the routes, API surface and integrations].<br/><br/>Find every feature where a user supplies a URL or an address and my server fetches it. Link previews, citation and metadata fetchers, webhook testers and endpoints, image proxies, RSS or feed importers, URL unfurlers, avatar imports, PDF or document fetchers, OAuth redirect handling, anything that validates a remote resource.<br/><br/>For each, tell me what the server can reach when it makes that request - internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, other customers' hosts, the public internet.<br/><br/>Anything on that list is a proxy. Treat the list as the finding.
2
Work Out Whether Your Limits Were Sized For Humans
Wikimedia's outage, if the link holds, came from query volume rather than from anything malicious. Volume is the attack.
Here are my current rate limits and quotas: [paste them]. Here is my normal traffic shape: [requests per day, peak concurrency, typical session].<br/><br/>Tell me what each limit implies about who it was written for, then model what happens under agent traffic: sustained parallel requests, no think time between calls, retries without backoff, and a crawl that walks every link it finds.<br/><br/>Identify which limit breaks first and what it takes down with it. Be specific about the resource that actually exhausts - connections, database, memory, a downstream API quota.
3
Design a Detection That Agents Would Actually Trip
Agent traffic does not look like bot traffic. It looks like a very fast, very thorough, very polite user.
My current bot detection is: [describe it - user agent checks, robots.txt, rate limits, CAPTCHA, fingerprinting].<br/><br/>Explain why each of those fails against a well-behaved agent that identifies itself honestly, respects robots.txt, stays under per-minute limits, and makes requests that look individually reasonable.<br/><br/>Then tell me what signal WOULD distinguish it: request patterns, breadth of traversal, timing regularity, the ratio of reads to writes, sequences no human session produces.<br/><br/>I want detection based on behaviour, not identity.
4
Audit What Your Write Endpoints Accept
A citation tool's configuration field became an attack surface because something else fetched what was put in it.
Here are the endpoints where users can write configuration, settings or content: [paste or describe them].<br/><br/>For each field, tell me whether its value is ever interpreted rather than just stored - fetched as a URL, executed as a template, parsed as a query, used as a path, passed to another service.<br/><br/>Those fields are the ones to worry about. Rank them by what an attacker gains from controlling the value, and tell me what validation each needs.<br/><br/>Include fields that look inert, like display names and descriptions, if anything downstream renders or resolves them.
5
Decide What You Actually Want Agents To Do
Most services have no policy, which is itself a policy - serve everyone, for free, until something falls over.
My service is: [describe it, and who uses it].<br/><br/>Help me decide a position on AI agents rather than drifting into one. Argue each honestly:<br/>- allow and serve them properly, with a documented API and sane limits<br/>- allow but meter, with identification and a quota<br/>- block what I can and accept the arms race<br/>- charge for programmatic access<br/><br/>Tell me which my situation supports given my costs, my users, and whether agent traffic creates value for me or only consumes capacity.
6
Write the Incident Note Before You Need It
Wikimedia said it believes the agents came from OpenAI, and said so as a belief. That is the standard to write to.
Draft the template I would use to disclose an incident caused by automated traffic against my service.<br/><br/>It should cover: what was observed, what was affected, what I can and cannot attribute, what I have changed, and what I am asking of the party involved.<br/><br/>Build in a clear separation between what I MEASURED and what I BELIEVE. If I name a company, the note must make clear which it is.<br/><br/>Keep it factual. No outrage, no speculation dressed as finding.